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ARTICLE
SE'ITING THE FEE WHEN THE CLIEN:i" DISCHARGES A
CONTINGENT FEE A'ITORNEY
Lester Brickman*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The bold and precedent-setting case of Martin v. Camp 1 endowed the
attorney-client relationship with the legacy of the "client discharge rule";
it provides that a client can discharge his attorney at any time without
cause and without penalty.2 The predicate of the rule is that trust and
confidence are essential features of the attorney-client relationship.3 If that
trust and confidence dissipate, the client should not be forced to continue
to confide in and rely upon that attorney. Accordingly, the client should
not be penalized financially if he elects to change attorneys. The discharged attorney, precluded from realizing the contingent percentage as
contract damages, is, however, entitled to a quantum meruit recovery.• A
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I would like to acknowledge the
invaluable assistance of my research assistants, Stephanie Goldstein and Rebecca Silberstein, in the
preparation of this Article.
1
114 N .E. 46, reh'g denied , 114 N .E. 1072 (1916), modified, 115 N .E. 1044 (N.Y. 1917).
• 114 N.E. at 48. While clients have freedom to dismiss their attorneys for any reason, attorneys

do not have the ability to arbitrarily withdraw from the representation of their clients. MODEL Com:
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-32, DR 2-110 (1981); MODEL RULF.S OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1983).
• See infra notes 44-58 and accompanying text.
• Martin , 114 N.E. at 48.
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majority of jurisdictions, many with previously opposing holdings/ have
come to adopt this rule. 6
The central unresolved issue which has divided the jurisdictions adopting Martin v. Camp is whether the contract percent is a cap on the discharged attorney's recovery. That is, is the discharged attorney limited to
the percentage of the underlying recovery set by his contingent fee and,
therefore, a zero recovery if the client recovers nothing in the underlying
action? Some jurisdictions which follow the client discharge rule regard
the occurrence of the contingency in the underlying suit as essential to the
discharged attorney's recovery and limit that recovery to the contract
price, 7 i.e., the contingent fee percentage applied to the recovery. Others
have allowed the discharged attorney to sue at once for quantum meruit, 8
thereby deeming the realization of the contingency and the amount actually recovered by the client as irrelevant in determining the quantum meruit fee. 9 Still other courts, determining the discharged attorney's fees after
. the client has recovered in the underlying suit, have allowed the attorney
to recover in excess of the contract price.10 The genesis of allowing a penalizing assessment against the discharging client is a peculiar twist in the
Martin v. Camp facts. In Martin v. Camp, the New York Court of Appeals, to preclude the discharge~ attorney from collecting any fee, 11 held
that the statute of limitations was tolled at the time of discharge. 12 Not
realizing that this could give rise to the possibility that a lawyer would sue
in quantum meruit immediately upon discharge, long before the outcome
of the underlying con_tingent fee action, 13 the court inadvertently sowed
the seed that would partially destroy what it had labored to create. Subsequently, courts seized upon the language in Martin v. Camp pertaining to
immediate accrual to allow a recovery by the attorney even if the client in
the contingency fee action does not ultimately prevail. u
• See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
• See infra note 37.
• See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
• See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
• See infra note 78.
•• See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
,. Martin, 114 N.E. at 49.
•• See infra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
•• See, e.g., Dill v. Public Util. Dist. No. 2, 475 P.2d 309, 312 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) ("such
cause of action by an attorney arises on the date of discharge and the statute of limitations begins to

1992]

SETTING THE FEE

369

Thus, the literal language of the statute of limitations issue in Martin
v. Camp is used to defeat its major thrust - enabling the client to discharge his attorney at any time and for any reason without penalty.
Under this anomalous interpretation of Martin v. Camp, a client who
discharges his contingent fee attorney and realizes no recovery may be
worse off than a client having to pay contract damages in a jurisidiction
which has rejected Martin v. Camp.111 In the latter, the client is liable
only for the contracted-for contingent fee - a percentage of the recovery.
Thus, if there is no recovery, there is no fee. 16
Although Martin v. Camp guaranteed the client a penalty-free discharge right by implying it into the contract, obviously the client is penalized if he has to pay a fee irrespective of a recovery in the underlying suit.
This penalty is particularly unfair when the retainer agreement stipulates
that the fee is contingent on recovery.17 Martin v. Camp, as the sower of
the seed that consumed its progeny, must be revisited and the language
allowing immediate suit redefined to accomplish what the court in Martin
v. Camp, and what the courts adopting Martin v. Camp, sought to do protect the interests of the client.
This Article critiques those decisions which elevate the literal language
of the statute of limitations issue in Martin v. Camp over its central holding, as well as those decisions which allow recovery beyond the contract
price. To resolve the anomaly that has resulted, this Article recommends
that clients who employ an attorney under a contingency fee arrangement,
and thereafter discharge the attorney, may not be forced to pay a quantum
meruit fee unless the underlying suit is successful. In those cases, the contingency percent should be a cap on the attorney's recovery. Simply stated,
a client who agreed to retain a lawyer on the condition that, except for
run on that date").
11
"Damages for wrongful discharge or breach of a contract for services are ordinarily the profits
which might have been earned except for such breach." In re Montgomery's Estate, 6 N.E.2d 40, 42
(N.Y. 1936) (Lehman, J., dissenting). For example, one jurisdiction, rejecting the client dicharge rule,
allows the attorney to recover only the price of the contract less expenses saved as a consequence of the
breach, according to traditional contract principles. See Anderson v. Gailey, 606 P.2d 90, 96 (Idaho
1980); m also Tonn v. Reuter, 95 N .W.2d 261 , 265 (Wis. 1959).
1t The lawyer's loss of expectancy, however, may be regarded as compensable. See, e.g., Anderson, 606 P.2d at 94-95.
17 See infra note 75 and accompanying text. If a client is penalized, the discharge right is substantially threatened since a client's ability to discharge his attorney is inhibited by the prospect of
paying two contingency fees.
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litigation costs, he would not have to pay an out-of-pocket fee, should not
have to pay such a fee for any reason when exercising his right to terminate a lawyer in whom · he no longer reposes trust and confidence. To
effectuate this policy, the courts that have depreciated the central holding
of Martin v. Camp must either 1) overrule the statute of limitations as- .
pect of Martin v. Camp and hold that the cause of action does not accrue
until there is success in the underlying suit or 2) continue the rule but add
as a corollary that the attorney's action is stayed until the underlying action is resolved. 18 However, in either case, the courts must limit the attorney's recovery to the contract price.

II.

THE CLIENT'S RIGHT TO DISCHARGE

In Martin v. Camp, an attorney employed under a contingent fee
agreement was discharged without cause 19 and substituted after he had
rendered services under the contract of employment.20 The New York
Court of Appeals unanimously held that a client's right to discharge his
attorney is an implied term of their contract flowing from "the peculiar
relation of trust and confidence that such a relationship implies." 21 Therefore, when a client exercises this implied contractual term it is not a
breach of contract, and hence there is no liability for contract damages.22
The discharged attorney is relegated to a quan_tum meruit recovery 23 11
Courts have discretion to review whether the election of a presently payable quantum meruit
fee is reasonable. Stt, e.g., Shelbourne Garage Inc. v. Licht, 309 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970)
(whether fee shall be paid immediately or deferred until the outcome of the case is within the sound
discretion of the court); Friedman v. Gordan, 23 N .Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940). While arguably the court's discretionary powers could prevent injustice, this Article recommends that the establishment of a prophylactic rule which fully embodies the principles of the client discharge rule is a far
better approach to the problem.
•• Stt infra notes 119-37 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of cause).
•• Martin , 114 N .E. at 46.
11
Id . at 47. For a fuller discussion of fiduciary principles underlying the attorney-client relationship, sec infra notes 44-58 and accompanying text.
11
Reiterating the strong policy stance guiding the decision , the court stated that "if the client has
the right to terminate the contract, he cannot be made liable in damages for doing that which under
the contract he has a right to do." Martin, 114 N .E. at 48; see also Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 13
(Cal. 1972) ("It would be anomalous and unjust to hold the client liable in damages for exercising
that basic implied right. "); Rhodes v. Norfolk & W . Ry. Co., 399 N .E.2d 969 (Ill. 1979) (maintaining that a client's right to discharge his attorney at will is a term implied by law which inures from
the special features of the attorney-client relationship) .
.. Martin , 114 N .E. at 48. By awarding quantum meruit to innocently dismissed attorneys, the
courts have thus attempted to promote public confidence in the legal profession while simultaneously
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the reasonable value of services rendered.
When writing the decision, the court was aware that it was rejecting
the existing contract damage rule that had been adopted in Ohio, California, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Texas, and Illinois.u Its opinion incorporated fiduciary principles into the retainer agreement and elevated
the interests of the client over those of the attorney. The court's recognition of the significance of the client discharge rule is patent since its articulation was not essential to the outcome of the case. The court simply
could have said the discharged attorney was entitled to quantum meruit
without reference to the special nature of the attorney-client relationship
which usurped the attorney's right to contractual damages. According to
the court, the special nature of the attorney-client relationship unequivocally necessitated the establishment of the client discharge rule.

A.

The Contract Damages Rule

As damages for breach of contract, the injured party may, inter alia,
seek restitution, which is the value of the benefit conferred on the breaching party. 26 As the restitutionary interest is usually smaller than the expectation or reliance interests, the injured party will rarely choose restitution as the measure of damages.26 A notable exception is in the situation
of the losing contract. Here, the non-breaching party has made an improvident bargain; if he completes the contract and receives the contract
price, he will be worse off than if he had not entered the bargain. In such
preventing the unjust enrichment or clients who, knowing they have an unbridled right or discharge,
might try to capitalize on their counsel's tenuous standing. DeMov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz,
428 N.E.2d 387, 390 (N.Y. 1981); see also Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1019 (Fla. 1982)
(discussing need to balance attorney's right to compensation with client's freedom to discharge at will).
One commentator discussing both the quantum meruit rule and contract damages rule maintained ·
that a court's willingness to adopt one or the other would largely depend upon whether it wanted to
protect the "attorney-client professional relationship" or the attorney's economic interests. See William
F. Hods, Note, Attorney Client - Damages - Breach of Contingent Fee Contract, 1960 Wis. L.
Rt:v. 156, I 58-59. Thus, what a court wants to do "depends upon which policy it desires to protect."
Id . at 161.
14
Martin , 114 N.E. at 48. The only one or these states that remains a contract damages jurisdiction is Texas. However, a recent Fifth Circuit decision made a plea to Texas courts that they reconsider the rule in order to av~id what it perceived as inequitable results. Johnston v. California Real
Estate Inv. Trust, 912 F.2d 788, 789 (5th Cir. 1990) .
.. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS§ 12.19 (2d ed. 1990).
11
Id.
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a losing contract, where the injured party would suffer loss but for the
other party's serendipitous breach, the non-breaching party will prefer
quantum meruit as a measure of damages because that will yield him
more than a recovery under the contract. Under the majority rule, such a
non-breaching party is not limited to the contract price, but can receive
quantum meruit in excess of the contract price. 27 Therefore, under contract law, the breaching party may be assessed an amount greater than the
contract price.28
The application of this restitutionary rule to the attorney-client contract
leads to the conclusion that the discharged attorney is not limited to the
contract price. However, Martin held that attorney-client agreements are
not decided according to contract principles, but rather are governed by
fiduciary principles.29 A split of authority exists between jurisdictions
adopting Martin and those adhering to contract rules in the resolution of
attorney-client disputes.3 ° Courts not adopting Martin have continued to
treat a discharge as a breach of the employment contract between attorney
and client. 31 Under the contract damages rule in Texas, for example, the
17
See JoHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS§ 15-4 (3d ed. 1987) (" By the
weight of authority the plaintiff is not restricted to the contract rate of payment although the contract
price is admissible as evidence of the value of his performance."); George E. Palmer, The Contract
Price as a Limit on Restitution for Defendant's Breach, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 264 (1959).
18
See Scaduto v. Orlando, 381 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1967) ("Although the contract rate may be
considered in receiving evidence of value , it neither measures value nor limits the amount which can
be recovered."); United States v. Zara Contracting Co., 146 F .2d 606 (2d Cir. 1944) (contract price of
a construction or excavation contract does not limit recovery). But see Kehoe v. Mayor of Rutherford,
27 A. 912 (N.J. 1893) (contractor limited to fraction of contract price corresponding to fraction of
work completed). Farnsworth notes that if the contract price is not a ceiling on recovery , the result
may be a more generous recovery for part performance than full performance. See FARNSWORTH,
supra note 25. See also Oliver v. Campbell, 273 P .2d 15 (Cal. 1954) (lawyer who fully performed
was limited to $7 50 fee agreed upon in the contract, but if his performance had been considered
partial , he would have received $5,000 value of services rendered).
•• See infra notes 45-46. See also In re Swartz, 686 P.2d 1236, 1243 (Ariz. 1984) (holding
contract for fee must be reduced if it later proves unreasonable) ; Simon v. Metoyer, 383 So. 2d 1321 ,
1323 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (In suing his client for collection of fees , an attorney "urges the application
of ordinary commercial laws. In light of the fiduciary obligation involved, the Court finds those rules
inapplicable.").
•• See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
11
E.g., Rocha v. Ahmad , 676 S.W .2d 149 (Tex . Ct. App. 1984). Texas has consistently remained a contract damages jurisdiction. See supra note 24. Only a small number of jurisdictions allow
an attorney to sue for contract damages, and the formula used varies. See Anderson v. Gailey, 606
P.2d 90, 96 (Idaho 1980) (wrongfully discharged attorney entitled to recover on contingency contract,
but da mages are measured by contract price minus expenses saved by not completing performance);
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discharged attorney may elect either to treat the contract as rescinded and
recover under quantum meruit or recover the full contract price. 32 This
allows the attorney to recover under quantum meruit although the client
does not recover in the underlying suit. When the client does recover, the
attorney may recover in quantum meruit in excess of the contract price.
Some courts which have adopted Martin v. Camp have nonetheless retained significant aspects of the contract damages rule. 33 These courts allow the attorney to recover in quantum meruit irrespective of the recovery
by the client in the underlying action or in excess of the contract price and
are, in fact , closer in spirit to contract damages jurisdictions than to quantum meruit jurisdictions. For example, in Salem Realty Co. v. Matera, 34
the Massachusetts Appeals Court eloquently advocated in favor of the client's right to discharge his attorney. 311 However, the court then permitted
the attorney to recover in excess of the contract price, using language very
similar to that used in contract damages jurisdictions.36 The court thus
donned the judicial mantle of protector of clients' rights by adopting the
modern fiduciary rule to govern attorney fees while permitting the attorney to reap the benefits of the contract damages rule which most jurisdictions have rejected.

B.

Evolution of Martin v. Camp

So compelling was the court's rationale in Martin v. Camp that it has
now become the national rule, conquering the jurisdictions with its force
of reasoning.37 Unfortunately, despite its enduring contribution to national
LaBach v. Hampton, 585 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (proper measure of damages for
discharged attorney employed under contingent contract is the contract price minus the reasonable
value of services of other attorneys needed to complete the contract). Kentucky once _allowed the attorney only quantum meruit recovery . See Henry v. Vance, 63 S.W .2d 273 (Ky. 1901). Now, however,
Kentucky has reversed the trend most other states are following. Set infra note 37 .
11
Rocha , 676 S.W.2d at 156 .
.. Su infra notes 76-80.
14
410 N.E.2d 716, 719 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980), ajfd, 426 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1981).
••Id.at 719. See infra note 77 .
.. Compare Salem Realty, 410 N .E.2d at 719, a "Martin v. Camp" case ("Since the contingent
fee agreement will not govern a discharged lawyer's compensation [it cannot be used to limit the
attorney's recovery. The client] cannot have it both ways.") with the "contract damages" case of
Thompson v. Smith, 248 S.W. 1070, 1073 (Tex. Ct. App. 1923) ("[the contingency fee agreement]
was broken by one of the parties, and was no longer binding in any respect on either of them").
87
Set , e.g. , Owens v. Bolt, 118 So. 590 (Ala. 1928); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. St. Joseph's
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jurisprudence, Martin v. Camp has been ill-treated by several jurisdictions.38 Although it was, and still remains, an exemplary decision, in defeating the discharged lawyer by invoking a statute of limitations rule the
Martin court inadvertently sowed the seeds for the partial destruction of
the very client discharge rule it was so determinedly articulating.

The Statute of Limitations
In Martin v. Camp, the court was aware that the client had already
recovered a fee in the underlying action. Attempting to avoid being barred
by the statute of limitations, the discharged attorney argued that since his
compensation was initially contingent upon an award being made to the
client, his cause of action did not accrue until the bargained for contin-

Hosp., 489 P.2d 837 (Ariz. 1971) (en bane); Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 741 S.W.2d 233
(Ark. 1987); Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972) (en bane); People v. Radinsky, 512 P.2d 627
(Colo. 1973) (en bane); Cole v. Myers, 21 A.2d 396 (Conn. 1941); Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d
1016 (Fla. 1982); Brookhaven Supply Co. v. Rary, 205 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); Booker v.
Midpac Lumber Co. , Ltd., 649 P.2d 376 (Haw. 1982); Finney v. Estate of Carter, 164 N.E.2d 656
(Idaho Ct. App. 1960); Rhodes v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. , 399 N.E.2d 969 (Ill. 1979); In re Phelps,
459 P.2d 172 (Kan. 1969), cert. denied, 397 'U.S. 916 (1970); Wright v. Fontana, 290 So. 2d 449
(La. Ct. App. 1974); Palmer v. Brown, 40 A.2d 514 (Md. 1945); Salem Realty Co. v. Matera, 410
N.E.2d 716 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980), ajfd, 426 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1981); Ambrose v. Detroit Edison
Co., 237 N.W.2d 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Lawler v. Dunn, 176 N .W. 989 (Minn. 1920); Plaza
Shoe Store, Inc. v. Hermel, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. 1982) (en bane); Baker v. Zikas, 125 N.W.2d
715 (Neb. 1964); In re Estate of Poli, 338 A.2d 888 (Merrer City Ct. 1975); In re Winston's Will,
59 P.2d 904 (N.M. 1936); Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916); Covington v. RhQdes, 247
S.E.2d 305 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 251 S.E.2d 468 (N.C. 1979); Fox & Assocs. Co.,
L.P.A. v. Purdon, 541 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 1989); First Nat'I Bank & Trust Co. v. Bassett, 83 P.2d
837 (Okla. 1938); Sundheim v. Beaver County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 14 A.2d 349 (Pa. Super. Ct.
· 1940); Lake v. Winfield Fuller Co., 173 A. 119 (R.I. 1934); Bonham v. Farmer, 148 S.E. 878 (S.C.
1929); Ritz v. Carpenter, 178 N.W. 877 (S.D. 1920); Price v. Western Loan & Savs. Co., 100 P. 677
(Utah 1909); Heinzman v. Fine, Fine, Legum & Fine, 234 S.E.2d 282 (Va. 1977); Wright v. Johanson, 233 P. 16 (Wash. Ct. App.), ajfd., 236 P. 807 (Wash. 1925); Clayton v. Martin, 151 S.E. 855
(W. Va. 1930); Enos v. Keating, 271 P. 6 (Wyo. 1928), reh'g denied, 275 P. 131 (Wyo. 1929). But
see Anderson v. Gailey, 606 P.2d 90 (Idaho 1980); Tri City Equip. Co. v. Modern Real Estate lnvs.
Ltd., 460 N.W.2d 464 (Iowa 1990); Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex.
1969); Knoll v. Klatt, 168 N .W.2d 555 (Wis. 1969). See also Johnston v. California Real Estate Inv.
Trust, 912 F.2d 788, 789 (5th Cir. 1990) (urging Texas to reject its "inequitable rule" and adopt
instead the client-discharge rule) .

.. See Lester Brickman & Larry Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible Under
Fiduciary, Statutory and Contract Law, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 173 nn .162-70 (1988).
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gency transpired. 39 Rather than respond to the attorney's argument, 40 the
court determined to preclude the discharged attorney from realizing any
fee whatsoever and therefore, oblivious to the underlying pathology of its
focus, blithely followed general principles regarding the tolling of the statute of limitations.41 Perhaps it was motivated to do so by the attorney's
extreme dilatoriness in pursuing a fee. The lawyer, discharged in 1900,
did not commence an action for attorney's fees until 1908 even though his
former client had recovered an award in 1902. 42
•• Martin , 114 N.E. at 49. There is an additional anomaly which arises from the court's rejection of the attorney's argument. The discharged attorney was arguing for the client discharge rule,
which this Article advocates and which is exemplified by such decisions as Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d
9 (Cal. 1972) (en bane) and Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982) wherein the courts
disallow the discharged contingent fee attorney a recovery of a fee unless there is a recovery by the
client in the underlying suit.
•• In effect, 1his was the argument upon which the appellate court rested. 146 N.Y.S. 1041
(N.Y . App. Div. 1914) ("If the action may be based on the contract, the terms of it must be observed.
Obviously, plain1iff could not prove a percentage of the recovery until the amount of it should be
known ."). Although quantum meruit is not an action on the contract, the terms of the contract can
certainly be· taken into account in making a determination of the reasonable amount of fees owed the
discharged attorney . See, e.g., Shattuck v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 48 F.2d 346 (W.D.N.Y. 1931). Forcing the attorney to pay immediately effectively incorporates a unilateral acceleration clause into the
contract which entirely disregards the discharge right implied by law.
41
Martin, 114 N.E. at 49 (citing Bathgate v. Haskin, 59 N.Y. 533 (1875) and Adams v. Fort
Plain Bank, 36 N .Y. 255 (1867)) . The determination in Martin that the attorney was only entitled to
recover a fee based upon quantum meruit ostensibly resolved the statute of limitations argument for
the court. In both Bathgate and Adams, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of when
the attorney had been terminated for the purpose of the statute of limitations which required that an
action be commenced within six years. In Bathgate, the court stated that "the statute does not begin to
run against his claim for compensation until his relation as attorney in the suit has terminated."
Bathgate, 59 N .Y. at 535. Similarly, in Adams, relying upon contract theory the court stated that "the
statute would undoubtedly run against the claim of an attorney for professional services if the services
were in any way brought to an end." Adams, 36 N .Y. at 260. However, these cases were not contingency fee cases and should be inapposite to the question at hand. For instance, one commentary citing
both Bathgate and Adams makes it explicit that their relevance is to situations where an attorney is
not employed under a contingency fee contract. 60 A.L.R.2d 1008 (1958) .
But see First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa v. Bassett, 83 P.2d 837 (Okla. 1938) (discharged
contingent fee attorney must await conclusion of case before his cause of action accrues; any demand
for fixing the value of services ahead of settlement is unreasonable). In Bassett, the court recognized
that there was a conflict in New York between Martin and Shattuck v. Pennsylvania R . Co., 48 F.2d
346 (W.D.N.Y. 1931) in that the former required immediate accrual while the latter maintained that
the discharged attorney should await the conclusion of the action . See also Bartlett v. Odd-Fellows'
Sav. Bank, 21 P. 743 (Cal. 1889) (Although overruled by the adoption of the quantum meruit rule,
the court held that the cause of action in a contingency fee case accrues when there is a recovery.).
41
Martin, 114 N .E. at 48-49. In fact, it was not even the discharged attorney who was suing the
client for the fee . The attorney's assignee sued the executor of the client's estate. Id. at 47.
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Although Martin held that the cause of action arose at discharge, it
neither stated nor implied that the occurrence of the contingency was not
essential to a recovery. That the statute of limitations is held to begin to
run upon the attorney's discharge does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the attorney can collect a quantum meruit award irrespective of
whether the client wins the underlying action. Indeed, the proposition is a
non-sequitor. Nonetheless, that is precisely the course of decision that has
followed.
Why did the court plant this pathology that would come to devour its
offspring? Since the issue of whether the attorney could recover in the
absence of a client recovery in the underlying action was not before it, the
court both failed to anticipate the possibility that a suit for fees could arise
prior to a result in the underlying action and neglected to expressly state
that the occurrence of the contingency in the underlying suit is essential to
the discharged attorney's recovery.
Would the court have so held? The entire thrust of Martin v. Camp
was to protect the client. It is inconceivable that the court would have
consciously allowed for the anomalous result that a client would have to
pay a fee to the discharged contingent fee attorney even though he recovered nothing in the underlying suit. That would clearly penalize the client
for exercising his discharge right, 43 which is prohibited by Martin v.
Camp. Martin v. Camp indubitably deserves greater respect than that.

C.

The Lawyer as Fiduciary

In rejecting the prevailing rule that allowed the attorney to recover contract damages when the client terminated the relationship without cause,
the Martin v. Camp court emphasized that "the peculiar relation of trust
and confidence that [the attorney-client] relationship implies" 44 renders
"(those opposing] decisions in other jurisdictions .. . [in]consistent with
the principles which define the nature of the contract under which an
attorney is employed, as those principles have been declared by the deci•• " If the client has the
client cannot be compelled to
contract." Martin , 114 N .E.
•• Martin , 114 N.E. at

right to terminate the relationship .. . it follows as a corollary that the
pay damages for exercising a right which is an implied condition of the
at 48.
47.
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sions of this court. " 46 Thus, the client discharge rule is premised upon
(and arguably compelled by) the fiduciary standards that underlie the attorney-client relationship. 46
A lawyer is a fiduciary for his client 47 since the client's retention of an

attorney to exercise "professional judgment" on his behalf necessarily requires that the client repose a high degree of trust and confidence in his or
her attorney.48 When the attorney exercises that professional judgment, he
•• Id . at 48; see also Krippner v. Matz, 287 N.W. 19, 24 (Minn. 1939) ("[I]t is a misconception
to attempt to force an agreement between an attorney and his client into the conventional modes of
commercial contracts . . .. [T]he agreement is . . . permeated with the paramount relationship of
attorney and client which necessarily affects the rights and duties of each.").
•• " The so-called [client discharge] rule is built upon the foundation of the special confidence
and trust which should set the attorney-client relationship apart from other employment relationships." Plaza Shoe Store, Inc. v. Hermel, Inc., 636 S.W .2d 53, 58 (Mo. 1982) (en bane). See also
Sohn v. Brockington , 371 So. 2d 1089, 1093 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) ("Certainly if one of the goals
of the attorney-client relationship is absolute confidence, a client should be free to discharge one attorney and hire another at will."); Salem Realty Co. v. Matera, 410 N .E.2d 716, 719 (Mass. App. Ct.
1980), ajfd, 426 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1981) ("Not only is contractual yoking of lawyer and client
impractical; it would diminish the integrity of the bar and undermine public confidence in it."); Farkas v. Sadler, 375 A.2d 960, 962 (R.I. 1977) ("It is universally recognized that the office of attorney
admits of the very highest confidence and depends upon a working if not harmonious relationship
between counsel and client. ... [therefore,] a client may discharge counsel with or without cause and,
thus, terminate the relationship.") (citations omitted); E. Randall Morrow, Note, Attorney's Right to
Compensation when Discharged Without Caust from a Contingent Fee Contract, 15 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 677, 684 (1979) (client discharge rule protects the attorney-client relationship).
41
See Greene v. Greene, 436 N .E.2d 496, 499 (N.Y. 1982) ("relationship between an attorney
and his client is a fiduciary one and the attorney cannot take advantage of his superior knowledge and
position"), overruled on other grounds by McDermott v. Torre, 437 N.E.2d 1108 (N.Y. 1982); Kelly
v. Greason , 244 N .E.2d 456, 460 (N.Y. 1968) ("a lawyer, as one in a confidential relationship and as
any fiduciary , is charged with a high degree of undivided loyalty to his client"). See also Gaffney v.
Harmon, 90 N.E.2d 785, 788 (Ill. 1950) ("a fiduciary relationship exists as a matter of law between
attorney and client"); CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 4.1, at 146 (1986) ("the
designation of 'fiduciary,' ... surely attaches to the [lawyer-client] relationship") .
.. E.g., Fisher v. State, 248 So. 2d 479,484 (Fla. 1971); Williams v. Griffin, 192 N .W .2d 283,
285 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971 ); In re Wilson , 409 A.2d 1153, 1154-55 (N.J. 1979); Rosner v. Paley, 481
N.E.2d 553, 554 (N.Y. 1985). The need for trust is also reflected in the ethical requirement that
communications to lawyers be kept confidential. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4- 101 (1982) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL Rut.ES]. See also Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 428
N.E.2d 387, 389 (N.Y. 1981) ("The unique relationship between an attorney and client [is] founded
in princi ple upon the elements of trust and confidence on the part of the client .... "); In re Dunn, 98
N.E. 914, 915 (N.Y. 1912) ("That the relationship between attorney and client is one of an unusual
character has been [routinely] affirmed . . . . [A]t its foundation [are] the elements of trust and
confidence on the part of the client and of undivided loyalty and devotion on the part of the
attorney .... ").
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must advance the client's interests as the client would define them if he
were fully informed. 49 Acting primarily, if not exclusively, in a client's
interest requires undivided loyalty 110 and zealous devotion .111 In order to
inspire their clients' trust and confidence, attorneys are obliged to maintain confidentiality, 112 avoid conflicts of interest, 113 present information honestly, safeguard property, and disclose information relevant to their duties
as fiduciaries."' "[N]othing [is] more critical to the professional relationship between attorney and client than the trust and confidence of the person being represented. " 1111
A client who loses confidence in his lawyer is less likely to disclose to
him information potentially injurious to the client's interests, but essential
to the lawyer's performance of the agreed upon service. 116 Because the lawyer is typically retained to evaluate and advise, the client's selection of a
course of action based upon that advice is undermined by a loss of trust
and confidence. Therefore, the unique relationship between lawyer and
client is mortally attenuated by a loss of essential trust and confidence
since "inherent in the relationship between attorney and client is the fact
that the client must rely almost entirely upon the good faith of the attor" See MODEi. CoDE, supra note 48, EC 7-8; .MODEL RULES, supra note 48, Rule 1.2(a). The
client often relies on the lawyer for assistance in determining the client's best interests. The necessity
of such reliance requires that the client have complete confidence in the integrity and ability of the
auorney and that absolute fairness and candor characterize all dealings between them. Rosenberg v.
Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1021 (Fla. 1982); see also Alison G . Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 759 (1978); Arthur Jacobson , The
Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty & Associations in the Common Law, 29 BuFF. L. REV .
599, 616-20 (I 980).
•• See MODEi. Ruu:s, supra note 48, Ruic 1.7 cmt. 1 ("Loyalty is an essential clement in the
lawyer's relationship to a client."); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of
the Lawyer-Client Relation , 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1061 (1976). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
11
See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 48, DR 7-101.
11
See , e.g., id. DR 4-101; MODEL RULES, supra note 48, Rule 1.6.
18
See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 48, Rules 1.7-1.9 .
.. Rogers v. Niforatos, 394 N.Y.S.2d 473 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). See generally MODEL CooE
and Moon RULES, supra note 48.
11
Fox & Assocs. Co., L.P.A. v. Purdon, 541 N.E.2d 448, 450 (Ohio 1989) .
.. "A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer ... [and a] lawyer
should be fully informed of all facts of the mailer he is handling in order for his client lo obtain the
full advantage of our legal system ... ." MODEL CODE, supra note 48, EC 4-1. "[A]n attorney
cannot represent a client effectively and to the full extent of his or her professional capability unless
the client maintains the utmost trust and confidence in the auorney. " Demov v. Glantz, 428 N .E.2d
387, 389 (N.Y. 1981).
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ney . . . ." 117 Accordingly, even though the attorney has not committed
such a breach of the employment contract as would allow the client to
consider the contract terminated, Martin v. Camp holds that even without
legal cause, the client may nonetheless discharge his attorney wi"thout penalty when the client is no longer able to place his trust and confidence in
that attorney .118

D.

The Contingent Fee Contract

A contingent fee is a risk-sharing joint venture to which the client
brings his claim and the attorney, his time and effort. 119 The attorney's
compensation is determined by the ultimate recovery. If there is no recovery, the attorney will earn no fee. 60

In exchange for assuming the risk of no or low recovery, as well as the
risk of having to devote considerably more time to the venture than anticipated, the attorney charges. a risk premium: a multiple of his opportunity
cost (hourly rate). 61 That premium is both payment for the lawyer's lend1
•
Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 12 (Cal. 1972). See also Heinzman v. Fine, Fine, Legum &
Fine, 234 S.E.2d 282, 285 (Va. 1977) ("[T}he layman must rely upon the knowledge, experience,
skill and good faith of the professional.").
•• "Unless [the client discharge] rule is adopted allowing an attorney as full compensation the
reasonable value of services rendered to the time .of discharge, clients will often feel required to continue in their service attorneys in whose integrity, judgment or capacity they have lost confidence."
Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 12-13.
'" See generally Lester Brickman, Contingent Fus Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the
Prince of Denmark, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29 (1989); DeGraff v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 292
N.E.2d 310, 314-17 (N.Y. 1972) (Breitel, J., dissenting).
00
A contingent fee can be defined as a fee received for services performed on behalf of a client if,
and only if, some recovery is achieved through the lawyer's efforts. Its distinguishing characteristic is
the negative: if no recovery is obtained for his client, the lawyer is not entitled to a fee . F .B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 3 (1964). "The critical element [of a contingent fee]
is that there be some chance that the lawyer will not receive the fee because the representation ends
with an unwanted result for the lawyer's client." WOLFRAM , supra note 47, § 9.4.1, at 526. Stt also
Clark v. Sage, 629 P.2d 657, 661 (Idaho 1981) (stating that "a contingent fee .. . involves a risk
factor"); High Point Casket Co. v. Wheeler, 109 S.E. 378, 380 (N .C . 1921) (stating that a contingent
fee contract amounts to at least an equitable assignment of the judgment pro tanto). For a concise
discussion of policy arguments mounted in regard to contingent fees in the client discharge context, see
Note , Attorney's Right to Compensation when Discharged Without Cause from a Contingent Fee
Contract - Covington v. Rhodes, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677, 681 nn.25-28 (1979).
•• See Brickman, supra note 59, at 117-19; Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council
for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 735-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In the private market, lawyers
charge a premium when their entire fee is contingent on winning .. .. The premium . .. compensates
for the risk of nonpayment if the suit does not succeed . ... ") (emphasis in original).
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ing of services to the client and assumption of the recovery and time expenditure risks. A contingent fee is, therefore, a financing device which
provides access to the courthouse62 for both the impecunious client and the
risk-averse client who can afford to pay an hourly rate but opts for a
contingent fee .63 Regardless of the financial status of the client, an essential feature of the contingent fee is the limitation of fee cost to the client to
a percentage of the amount awarded as a recovery. 64

Ill.
A.

ASCERTAINING THE QUANTUM MERUIT RECOVERY

The Various Approaches

Although most jurisdictions apply the quantum meruit rule to a client's
right to discharge, 611 jurisdictions are split as to whether the contract price
is a limit on the recovery when the discharged attorney had been employed under a contingency fee contract. 66 There are two main approaches
with variations from state to state.

1.

The Preferable Rule as Exemplified by Rosenberg v. Levin 67

In Rosenberg, a lawyer who had been employed under a contingency
fee contract was discharged without cause. The court held that the discharged attorney was entitled to a quantum meruit recovery, a ruling
which was bolstered by two salutary caveats. First, the cause of action was
deferred until the occurrence of the contingency. 66 If the client failed to
•• Brickman, supra note 59, at 43 , 74; MoDF.L CODE, supra note 48 , EC 2-20 (" [T]hey often ,
and in a variety of circumstances provide the only practical means by which one having a claim
against another can economica lly afford , finance , and obtain the services of a competent lawyer to
prosecute his claim . . . . "); Lora ine Minish, The Contingent Ftt: A Rt-examinat, 10 MANITOBA
L .J. 65, 75 (1979) (" There are those who feel that ' the contingent fee is the poor man's key to the
courthouse door.' ") (citation omitted).
•• Brickman, supra note 59, at 43 .
.. MODEL Com;, supra note 48 , DR 5-103(A). Although the client remains responsible for
litigation expenses, in many successful contingent fee representations, the attorney makes no effort to
recover litigation expenses from the client.
•• See supra note 37.
88
The issue is often expressed as when the cause of action accrues.
17
409 So. 2d I 016 (Fla. I 982). The other leading case is Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal.
I 972) , which ten years earlier established the principle of the contract price cap.
88
409 So. 2d at 1020; see also Henry , Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 741 S.W .2d 233 (Ark .
1987); Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972); Fox & Assocs. Co., L.P.A. v. Purdon , 541 N .E.2d
448 (Ohio 1989).
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recover in the underlying suit, the discharged attorney would not be entitled to any compensation. 89
This policy, while preserving the freedom of the client to discharge the
attorney at will, places a modest burden upon the discharged attorney;
even without being discharged, he would not have benefited unless the
contingency had transpired. 70 The Florida Supreme Court particularly
emphasized the inequity of burdening a client, who may be of limited
means, with paying a fee regardless of the outcome of the underlying litigation.71 The court also stressed that the "amount involved" and "results
obtained," two important factors in determining the reasonableness of the
fee, cannot be determined until the conclusion of the case. 72 Thus, the
court, in balancing two distinct goals - those of the client's right to discharge and the attorney's right to compensation - reconciled them such
that the most equitable result was attained without compromising the relative importance of each policy. It also sustained the major thrust of Martin v. Camp - protecting the client's right to discharge without penalty
- thereby circumventing the quagmire of the anomaly.
Second, the court stated that the attorney's recovery was limited to the
contract percentage.73 Stating the objectives of fostering public confidence
in the legal profession and maintaining the trust and confidence essential
to the attorney-client relationship,7'' the court maintained that any rule
•• "If the client fails in his recovery, the discharged attorney will similarly fail and recover
nothing .... Deferral, however, supports our goal to preserve the client's freedom to discharge .... "
Rosenberg, 409 So. 2d at 1022.
70
Id. at 1020 (" '[S]ince the attorney agreed initially to take his chances on recovering any fee
whatever, we believe that the fact that the success of the litigation is no longer under his control is
insufficient to justify imposing a new and more onerous burden on the client.' ") (citing Fracasse v.
Brent) . But s.ee Tillman v. Komar, 181 N .E. 75 (N.Y. 1932) (arguing that the discharged attorney
did not take his chances on relying on another member of the bar). Tillman is discussed extensively
infra note 8 I.
71
Rosenberg, 409 So. 2d at 1020; see also Plaza Shoe Store, Inc. v. Hermel, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 53
(Mo. 1982) (stressing that it would be improper to burden a client who discharged his attorney
pursuant to the client discharge rule with the obligation to pay a fee regardless of the outcome of the
case).
71
Rosenberg, 409 So. 2d at 1020. Although the Martin court failed to state what criteria should
be used to establish a reasonable fee due the attorney, relevant factors are set out in the Model Code
DR 2-106, supra note 48. See infra notes I 13-18 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of the factors involved in determining reasonable fees .
11
Rosenberg, 409 So. 2d at 1021.

"Id.
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failing to limit quantum meruit recovery to the contract price would penalize the client for exercising his contractual right to discharge his
attorney. 711

2.

The Contrary Rule: Allowing Recovery Beyond the Contract Price

A contrary approach is followed by courts in Illinois, Minnesota, New
York, and Washington, all of which allow immediate suit. 78 Hawaii and
Massachusetts, though not dealing with the timing of the attorney's suits
because the clients had already recovered in their underlying actions, held
that the attorney's recovery could exceed the contract price. 77 New York
courts, in particular, have issued prolific pronouncements on the issue.78
76
Id. "The right to discharge one's attorney would be of little value if the client were liable for
the full contract price." Fox & Assocs. Co., L .P .A. v. Purdon, 541 N .E .2d 448, 450 (Ohio 1989). If a
client is forced to pay in excess of the contract price, "the client would frequently be forced to choose
between continuing the employment of an attorney in whom he has lost faith or risking the payment
of double fees." Succession of Jenkins , 481 So. 2d 607, 611 (La. 1986) (Dennis, J ., concurring); see
also Miller v. Paul, 615 P .2d 615, 619 (Alaska 1980) (Matthews, J., dissenting) ("Imposing an
immediate obligation to pay unduly burdens the client's right to discharge his attorney , and additionally, is often unfair to the client because he cannot afford to pay a fee unless a recovery in the
underlying case is received."); William D . Hunter, Note, Limiting the Wrongfully Discharged Attorney's Recuvery to Quantum Meruit - Fracasse v. Brent, 24 HASTINGS L .J. 771, 774 (1973) ("The
protection afforded to the client becomes illusory if the discharged attorney's recovery on quantum
meruit exceeds the contract price.").
'" See , e.g. , In re Estate of Callahan, 544 N .E.2d 112 (Ill . App. Ct. 1989) (allowing discharged
contingent fee attorney to recover fee immediately); Trenti v. Nartnik , 439 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989) ; Lai Ling Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., 539 N.E.2d 570 (N .Y. 1989); Dill v. Public
Util. Dist. No. 2, 475 P .2d 309, 312 (Wash. 1970).
77
See. e.g., Haddick, Reinwald , O'Connor & Marrack v. Lotsof, 719 P .2d 1107, 1112 (Haw.
Ct. App. 1986) ("[I]n some cases a contingent fee of lOOo/o or more than lOOo/o of the clients recovery
is ethically permissible."); Salem Realty Co. v. Matera, 410 N .E.2d 716, 719 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980)
(by discharging attorney, client terminated the contract and, therefore, agreement no longer governed
attorney's compensation).
71
New York, as originator of Martin v. Camp, has extensively addressed this situation:
Under New York law a client may discharge an attorney at any time ... [and] the attorney is entitled to recover compensation from the client measured by the fair and reasonable
value of the services rendered whether that be more or less than the amount provided in the
contract .. . . [T]he compensation [can] be a fixed dollar amount determined at the time of
discharge ... or, in the alterriative, they may agree that the attorney, in lieu of a presently
fixed dollar amount , will receive a contingent percentage fee determined either at the time
of substitution or at the conclusion of the case.
Lai Ling Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., 539 N.E.2d 570, 572 (N .Y. 1989) (citations omitted).
This language is substantially the same as that used by numerous other courts. See , e.g. , Paolillo v.
American Export Isbrandtscn Lines, Inc. , 305 F . Supp. 250 (S.D .N.Y . 1969); Pearl v. Metro. Trans.
Auth ., 548 N .Y.S.2d 669 (N .Y. App. Div. 1989); Paulsen v. Halpin, 427 N .Y.S.2d 333 (N.Y. App.
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Though it is clear that New York courts do not limit recovery to the
contract price, 79 some New York courts have rendered conflicting decisions regarding the time when the -quantum meruit sum is to be ascertained80 and whether the occurrence of the contingency is a necessary condition for a quantum meruit recovery. 81 In its latest pronouncement, Lai
Div. 1980); Reilly v. Millcount Realty Corp., 419 N.Y.S.2d 644 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Strauss v.
Cunningham, 403 N .Y.S.2d 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); Chugerman v. Wagner, 337 N.Y.S.2d 839
(N.Y. App. Div. 1973); Beck v. Tepley, 337 N .Y.S.2d 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972); Shelbourne Garage, Inc. v. Licht, 309 N.Y.S.2d 850, 851 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); Reubenbaum v. B. & H . Express,
174 N.Y.S.2d 287 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958); Carroll v. Sertner, 113 N.Y.S.2d 684 (N.Y. App. Div.
1952). See also Annotation, When Statute of Limitation Commences to Run Against Action by Attorney Employed on Contingency Fee Who Was Discharged or Withdrew Before Determination of Litigation or Other Event Upon Which His Compensation Was Contingent, 118 A.L.R. 1281 (1938)
(Martin v. Camp being cited for the proposition of immediate accrual).
" E.g., In re Montgomery, 6 N .E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1936) (holding that the price of the contract docs
not limit quantum meruit recovery) ; see also Morrow , supra note 46, at 689-90 (criticizing the New
York rule "as dcfeat[ing] the policy against penalizing the client for exercising his right to discharge
his attorney, because he is essentially forced to pay damages for exercising a right").
80
See , e.g., In re Tillman, 181 N.E. 75 (N.Y. 1932) (attorney need not await outcome of litigation to have his fee determined; the reasonable amount may be fixed immediately); Paulsen v. Halpin,
427 N.Y.S.2d 333 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (attorney may sue at once for quantum meruit but court
can take into account the terms of the original retainer agreement). But see Shattuck v. Pennsylvania
R. Co., 48 F.2d 346 (W.D.N.Y. 1931) (finding that Martin v. Camp was silent on whether the fee
determination could be deferred until the outcome in the underlying action was known and then going
on to hold that it would await the outcome of the underlyling case to fix the fee so that the terms of
the original contract would not be ignored); Steves v. Serlin, .509 N .Y.S.2d 666 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(though discharged attorney is entitled to be reimbursed for disbursements at time of discharge, no fee
is owed until there is a recovery) ; In re Shaad, 399 N .Y.S.2d 822 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (amount of
attorney's recovery may be determined subsequent to any recovery in the underlying action); Friedman v. Gordon, 23 N .Y.S.2d 808 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940) (whether an attorney may have his fee fixed
immediately or deferred until the outcome of the litigation rests in the sole discretion of the court).
11
In Tillman v. Komar, 181 N .E. 75 (N.Y. 1932), the New York Court of Appeals held that
since the dismissed attorney's cause of action accrues immediately upon discharge, he cannot be forced
to await the outcome of the litigation to enforce his claim. The Tillman court thus appeared to reject
Martin v. Camp's " no penalty for discharge rule" in favor of its statute of limitations holding. Id . at
76. See also Kronish, Lieb, Shainswit, Weiner & Helman v. Ho~ard Stores Corp., 355 N .Y.S.2d 426
(N.Y. App. Div. 1974) ("Even if services, for which the [lawyer] was retained, had been completed
prior· to discharge, the [lawyer] would still be entitled to sue in quantum mtruit."). This is more than
an entitlement to the discharged attorney because under contract principles quantum meruit is not
limited by the price of the contract. However, while in accord with contract principles, such a broad
rule derived from cases such as this is an affront to Martin v. Camp. This facial discord, however, can
be resolved by a close examination of the Tillman facts. In Tillman , the client had discharged the
attorney after his right to a recovery had been established by the attorney's efforts; all that remained
to be done was mathematical calculation of the exact amount due to the client. 181 N .E. at 75. It is
thus apparent that the client was seeking to avoid paying the contractual fee that the attorney had
fully earned.
"Discharge on the courthouse steps" is a recognized exception to Martin v. Camp. Refuting the
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Ling Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., Inc. ("Cheng"), 82 the New York
Court of Appeals once again employed the client discharge rule without
fully and unambiguously resolving the issues of when suit may be brought
and whether recovery in the underlying action is a prerequisite to a quantum meruit recovery by the discharged attorney. However, the court almost certainly maintained its position that suit could be brought at once
and therefore the contract price was not a cap.
Like Martin v. Camp, Cheng involved a contingent fee case in which
there was an underlying recovery; like Martin v. Camp, the court anticipated that the fee setting would be done after the underlying action had
been decided; 83 like Martin v. Camp, it spoke broadly enough to include
within its ambit a right of the discharged attorney to recover a quantum
meruit fee even if the underlying action were unsuccessful; 84 and, like
Martin v. Camp, the court failed to specifically contemplate the ramificaargument that the adoption of the client discharge rule would lead to a wholesale discharging of
contingent fee attorneys, one court stated that "[t]o the extent that such discharge occurs 'on the
courthouse steps,' where the client executes a settlement obtained after much work by the attorney, the
factors involved in a determination of reasonableness would certainly justify a finding that the entire
fee was the reasonable value of the attorney's services." Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P .2d 9, 14 (Cal. 1972).
Therefore, "[i]n the event of full performance prior to discharge . . . the attorney may stand upon his
contract and the measure of his damages is the agreed upon services." McAvoy v. Schramme, 238
A.D .2d 225 , 228 (N .Y. 1933). "To hold otherwise would deny the performing party of the fruits of
his agreement. " Dill v. Public Util. Dist. No. 2, 475 P .2d 309, 312 (Wash. 1970). See also Henry,
Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 741 S.W.2d 233 (Ark . 1987); Macinnis v. Pope, 285 P.2d 688 (Cal.
1955); Kaushiva v. Hutter, 454 A.2d 1373 (D .C . 1983); Rhodes v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 399
N .E.2d 969, 975 (Ill. 1979); Smith v. Westside Transit Lines Inv., 313 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 1975);
Fox & Assocs. Co., L.P .A. v. Purdon , 541 N .E.2d 448 (Ohio 1989); Clerk of Superior Court of
Guilford County v. Guilford Builders Supply Co., 361 S.E .2d 115 (N.C . App. 1987); Covington v.
Rhodes, 247 S.E. 2d 305 (N .C. App. 1978).
In view of the Tillman facts, the case does not support the proposition for which it is widely cited
- that the contingent fee attorney is allowed to immediately seek quantum meruit, thereby, creating
the possibility of obtaining a judgment for a fee even if the underlying case yields no recovery.
81
539 N.E.2d 570 (N.Y. 1989).
11
Thus, the Cheng court said:
The percentage may be fixed at the time of substitution but, as several courts have recognized , is better determined at the conclusion of the case when such factors as the amount of
time spent by each lawyer on the case, the work performed and the amount of recovery can
be ascertained .
539 N.E.3d at 572 (citations omitted). The court went on to state that "(a] contingent percentage fee
is properly determined at the end of litigation when the amount of the recovery and the relative
contributions of the lawyers to it can be ascertained." Id . at 573 (citation omitted).
14
Upon discharge, "the attorney is entitled to recover compensation ... whether that be more or
less than the amount provided in the contract or retainer agreement." Id. at 572.
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tions of its broad pronouncement in cases where there was no underlying
recovery. 8 ~ In Cheng, the court interpreted an agreement between the outgoing and incoming attorneys which stated that the discharged attorney
had "a [contractual charging] lien for prior legal services rendered ... the
amount of which shall be subsequently determined at the conclusion of the
litigation." 88 The court held that this language represented an election by
the outgoing attorney of a quantum meruit contingent percentage which
"is properly determined at the end of the litigation when the amount of
the recovery and the relative contributions of the lawyers to it can be
ascertained. " 87
Although the holding in Cheng is sound, the troubling aspect of the
decision is the court's notation in dicta that when the dispute is between
the client and attorney, the attorney can elect between a fixed dollar
amount based upon quantum meruit at the time of discharge or a contingent percentage fee determined at the time of substitution or conclusion of
the case.88 Facially, the court's blatant allowance of a fixed fee regardless
of the outcome in the underlying litigation, while justified by Martin v.
Camp's holding regarding immediate accrual of the cause of action, ignores its policies, fails to promote public trust and confidence in the legal
profession, and inhibits the client's right to discharge. Had the attorney
not been discharged and the contingency not realized, the client would not
have owed the lawyer anything. However, according to Cheng and the
other jurisdictions following the contrary approach, 89 the client who exercises an implied contractual right to discharge his attorney can be forced
to pay a fee without regard to the eventual success of the underlying suit.

" In Cheng, the court repeated the usual litany that "(i]mmediately upon his discharge, (the
attorney] was entitled to be compensated in .. . quantum meruit . . .. " Id. at 573. The court then
stated that the lower court "could not consider the size of the recovery . .. [because] if the fee is
computed at the time of discharge, it is difficult to sec how it could be considered." Id . This language
could indicate that the court contemplated the possibility that the discharged attorney, by electing
quantum mcruit, would be able to collect a fee even if the underlying action were unsuccessful. However, since that issue was not before the court, it should not be held to such a view absent a specific
declaration , regardless how suggestive its language.

•• Id . at 571.
11

Id. at 573.

•• Id . Other cases also support this proposition. Stt supra note 78 and accompanying text.
11

See supra note 76.
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POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Courts which have been true to Martin v. Camp by holding that the
discharged attorney's compensation depends upon the success of the underlying action, have engaged the courts allowing the discharged attorney
to collect a fee regardless of the disposition of the underlying action, in a
policy discussion. These issues are examined in the following arguments.
A.

The Essence of the Bargain: A Tautology •

One of the frequently cited reasons for rejecting the client discharge
rule entirely or upholding it but entitling the attorney to quantum meruit
irrespective of the outcome of the underlying action is that while the attorney did enter a contingent fee contract based upon success in the underlying action, he did not bargain for another attorney completing his services.
It is argued, therefore, that it is inequitable for the discharged attorney to
have to rely upon the skills of the incoming attorney.90 To compensate the
attorney for the additional risk being imposed,91 the attorney should be
allowed a quantum meruit recovery irrespective of the outcome of the underlying action.
However, the mere fact that the success of the litigation depends on the
efforts of another does not, in and of itself, justify shifting the fee burden
to the client. 92 Under a contingent fee contract, an attorney initially agrees
80
Su, e.g., In re Estate of Callahan, 544N.E.2d112, 115 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) ("the discharged
attorney , who invested valuable time and talent on his client's behalf should not necessarily be denied
any recovery where his successor is inept"); Fracassc v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 23 (Cal. 1972) (Sullivan,
J., dissenting) (" [A]n attorney bargains for a limited risk - the risk that the . . . action may be
unsuccessful under his management. He docs not expect to hazard compensation for his services on
the client's choice of a substitute attorney .. . ."). The New York Coun of Appeals has also stated
that "[the incoming attorney] did not contract for his contingent compensation on the hypothesis of
success or failure by some other member of the bar . ... " Tillman v. Komar, 181 N .E. 75 (N .Y.
1932); see also William D. Bremer, Note, Fracasse v. Brent: Contingent Fet Compensation for an
Attorney Dischargtd Without Caust - A Right or a Mtrt Possibility1, 9 CAL. W. L. REV . 355, 364
(1974).
11
The potential return on the attorney's efforts in a contingent fee contract account for the
increased risk which he incurs. Irving Cohen, Note, For a Few Dollars Mort: Clitnt's Right to
Discharge His Attorney Under a Contingent Ftt Contract, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 913, 916 (1986).
11
"[Slincc the attorney agreed initially to take his chances on recovering any fee whatever ...
the fact that the success of the litigation is no longer under his control is insufficient to justify imposing a new and more onerous burden on the client." Fracassc v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 14 (Cal. 1972).
One New York court even stated that " the outgoing [contingent fee] attorney agreed to take the risk of
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to receive no fee from the client unless the client prevails. Furthermore,
because of the client discharge rule which implies a provision in the retainer agreement that the client may discharge the attorney for any reason
at any time, 93 an attorney could be discharged and lose the opportunity to
earn a contingent percentage of a recovery. Accordingly, the attorney is on
notice at the time of accepting employment that he might be solely dependent for his fee upon the efforts of another attorney if the client elects to
exercise his discharge right. 9 " To argue then that the attorney did not
bargain for that possibility is to state a tautology; if the rule is that he can
collect quantum meruit irrespective of the outcome of the underlying action, then, of course, the conclusion duly follows. But if the rule is th~t he
cannot obtain any fee, if discharged, unless the client prevails in the underlying action, then the conclusion follows that he could be solely dependent upon the efforts of another attorney and is, therefore, on notice of
that possibility at the time employment is accepted. To state the prevailing
rule is to state the conclusion.

B.

Chilling Effect

Some judges reject the client discharge rule in its entirety or advocate
only a modified version of the rule by allowing the discharged contingent
recovery in the original retainer . .. . [Therefore,] the proper course is to defer payment of disbursements out of the proceeds of any recovery." Rizzi v. City of New York, 380 N .Y.S.2d 697, 699 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1976). See also Heinzman v. Fine, Fine, Legum & Fine, 234 S.E.2d 282, 286 (Va. 1977).
In Heinzman the court, overruling the trial court's award of the contractual fee to the discharged
contingent fee attorney , maintained that such a rule "presuppose[s] that [the discharged attorney] . . .
would have achieved a recovery exactly equivalent to that achieved by [the substituted attorney]. But
this is entirely speculative [since he] might have . .. won a larger verdict . . . [or] he might have
recovered nothing." Id .
Cf Andrews v. Haas, 108 N .E. 423 (N.Y. 1915). In the Andrews case predating Martin v. Camp,
Justice Cardozo stated that "(t]he employment of a lawyer to serve for a contingent fee does not make
it the client's duty to continue the lawsuit and thus increase the lawyer's profit. " Id . at 423. He
believed that any other notion "betrays a strange misconception of the function of the legal profession
and of its duty to society." Id. at 424.
11
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text; see also Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman,
741 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Ark. 1987) (discharge right is an implied term of the contract); Sohn v. Brockington, 371 So. 2d 1089, 1093 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
'
" See Goodman, 741 S.W .2d at 236; Covington v. Rhodes, 247 S.E.2d 305, 308-09 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1978); Jacobson v. Sassower, 452 N.Y.S.2d 981,982 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982). Furthermore, dependence upon the efforts of another attorney for one's fee is not at all unusual in the bar; for example,
lawyers often refer clients to another lawyer for a percentage of the other lawyer's fee which is itself
contingent on success. See Brickman, supra note 59, at 108 n.317, 109 n.319.
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fee attorney to recover irrespective of the underlying action. They have
opined that any other outcome would effectively result in the inability of
clients to hire attorneys willing to accept contingent fee cases since "a
solemn valid agreement between attorney and client [could) be dissolved
into thin air at the mere whim of the client" 96 and the contract would
"only be as good as a client wishes it to be." 96 Couched in Lochner-like97
language, these courts seek to protect clients from being precluded access
to courts by restricting the scope of their discharge rights. Accordingly,
these judges have maintained that the quantum meruit rule "ignores the
realities of the contingent fee system and [would] prevent its use in the
future." 98 Yet, despite the ominous forewarnings of those judges attempt•• Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 17 (Sullivan, J., dissenting) ; see also Goodman , 741 S.W.2d at 237
(noting that an amicus brief filed on behalf of the discharged attorney argued that failure to award
contract damages to the discharged attorney would have a "chilling effect" on the utilization of contingent fee contracts); Anderson v. Gailey , 606 P.2d 90, 96 (Idaho 1980) (characterizing application of
the client discharge rule as a "dubious practice of finding 'implied in law' terms in the contingent fee
contract ... [which] strip[s] the attorney entirely of his right to rely on the contingent fee contract and
to sue for its breach"); Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products, Inc., 373 So. 2d 102, 121 (La. 1978)
(Dixon, J., dissenting) (arguing the court " unnecessarily cast doubts on contingent fee arrangements"
when it ruled that the discharged and substituted attorneys had to share fees) . But see Sohn, 371 So.
2d at 1093 (rejecting argument that adoption of the client discharge rule would lead to a "wholesale
discharge of attorneys by clients shopping for the least expensive fees"); In re Estate of Callahan, 544
N .E.2d 112, 115 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (rejecting the argument that the quantum meruit rule would
lead to clients discharging their attorneys in order to avoid paying fees) .
" Goodman, 741 S.W.2d at 239 (Glaze, J., dissenting) . Justice Glaze stated that the "court's
decision today , however, will assuredly and inevitably increase the instances of collusion and solicitation in cases and, for all practical purposes, destroy the use of contingency contracts." Id. at 238-39.
Other courts have also spoken along these lines. See, e.g., Dolph v. Speckart, 186 P. 32, 35 (Or. 1920)
(adhering to the contract damage rule when the attorney is discharged by the client, the court stated
"(a] party who has wrongfully broken a contract should not be permitted to reap advantage from his
own wrong"). See also Friedman v. Mindlin, 155 N.Y.S. 295, 299 (N.Y. City Ct. 1915). In Friedman, which arose before the New York Court of Appeals decision in Martin v. Camp, the court
upheld the right of the client to discharge at will , but stated rhat the attorney should not:
be held to assume the risk of his client discharging him at will and then paying him only
for the services rendered up to the time of the ·discharge. If his compensation is to be thus
subjected to the whim of his client, then it is useless for him to contract at all, since all
contracts of this character, whatever their form, would be only unilateral in effect. .. .
(T]he legal profession should [not] thus be shorn of its dignity , or that justice should be
thus denied to those who themselves minister at the altar of justice.
Id.
07
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TF.MPTING
OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 44-49 (1990) .
.. Covington , 247 S.E.2d at 308. Bludgeoning the attorney with his own argument, the court
maintained that the purpose of a contingency fee contract is not to enable the lawyer to better balance
his checkbook. Id . The court also asserted the client discharge rule would not lead to clients "using
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ing to preserve the contingent fee system for future clients (clients who
potentially would be unable to bring an action but for the availability of
contingent fee agreements), there is no evidence whatsoever, in jurisdictions that have either adopted the client discharge rule or defer the attorney's cause of action until recovery in the underlying suit, of a paucity of
attorneys willing to enter contingent fee agreements. 99 In fact, the enormous growth and overwhelming prevalence of contingency fee agreements
reveal exactly the opposite. 100 Thus, the argument that the abandonment
of the contract damages rule or adoption of a client discharge rule predicating the discharged attorney's fee recovery upon the outcome in the underlying suit will have a "chilling effect" upon the availability of contingent fee attorneys is, at best, without foundation.

C.

A Penalty is a Penalty is a Penalty 101

The core rationale of Martin v. Camp is that the client should not be
penalized for exercising his right to discharge his attorney .102 A client who
has to pay a quantum meruit fee though he loses in the underlying action
or recovers less than the amount of the fee claimed is being penalized for
exercising his discharge right. 103 Thus, the rule that allows immediate suit
for quantum meruit upon discharge, citing Martin v. Camp for supthe lawyer's services until all the work is done, then discharging him and settling the case themselves." Id. In fact, the courthouse steps exception would insulate lawyers from this possibility. See
supra note 81 . The realities of the contingent fee system, to which the attorney referred, are apparently that the contingent fee is the only access impecunious clients have to the legal system. See supra
notes 61-62 and accompanying text. Moreover, this argument is at least tangentially related to the
issue of whether the client has "legal cause" for discharging his attorney in that courts blithely assume
clients discharge attorneys for frivolous reasons. See infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
" Brickman, supra note 59, at 76 n.186.
''"' Contingent fee income for lawyers in personal injury cases exceeds $13 billion annually. See
Lester Brickman, A Massachusetts Debacle: Gagnon v. Shoblom, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1417, 1429
n.68 (1991). Texas, which rejects the client discharge rule, probably yields as high or a higher amount
of contingent fee income to plaintiffs' lawyers than a ny other state. See Peter Brimelow & Leslie
Spencer, The Plaintiff Attorneys' Great Honey Rush, FORBES, Oct. 16, 1989, at 197, 204-05; Robert
S England, Congress, Nader, and the Ambulance Chasers, THE AM. SPECTATOR, Sept. 1990, a t 18,
18-23; Suzanne L. Oliver & Leslie Spencer, Who Will the Monster Devour Next1, FORBES, Feb. 18,
1991 , at 75 , 77-78.
101
With apologies to Gertrude Stein.
••• Martin , 114 N.E. at 46 ("[I]f the client has the right to terminate the contract, he cannot be
made li able in damages for doing that which under the contract he has a right to do. " ).
••• See supra note 7 5 and accompanying text.
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port,I 04 essentially negates the essence of Martin v. Camp.

D.

Fiduciary Obligation

Martin v. Camp's discharge rule, which these courts purport to follow,
is predicated upon fiduciary concepts of trust and confidence_ Io& Fiduciary
law imposes a self-disinterested standard upon the fiduciary: in dealing
with his client, he must give the client the same non-self-interested advice
as the client would receive if he went to a second attorney for advice on
dealing with the first attorney. I08 The rule that allows quantum meruit in
excess of the contract price turns this fiduciary principle on its head. I07
By accepting the case on a contingent fee basis, the attorney has made a
judgment that the risk premium he is charging will compensate him for
the risk he is bearing. 108 If later he finds that he underestimated the risk,
he is not permitted to seek additional compensation from the client; likewise, if he overestimated the risk, the client may not seek a reduction in
the contingent fee provided that the attorney's risk assessment has been
professionally rather than self-interestedly motivated. An attorney
breaches his fiduciary obligation and the ethical standardioe when he exaggerates the risk in order to justify a contingent fee designed to yield a
return grossly disproportionate to the risk. 110
One effect of entitling the discharged contingent fee lawyer to quantum
meruit irrespective of the outcome of the underlying action is to give the
attorney a second opportunity to assess risk - at his client's expense. If at
the time of the discharge he believes the claim will yield a substantial
return, he can simply elect to wait until a result is achieved by his replacement. The amount of his recovery would then be enhanced by the
degree of success realized in the underlying action. In If however, his reas104

Ste, e.g., Lai Ling Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., 539 N.E.2d 570 (N.Y. 1989).
See supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text.
,oe Lester Brickman, Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration: A Dissenting View, 1990 UTAH L. REV.
277, 284.
101
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
108
The lawyer can decline the case if the risk is too high or the anticipated return too low.
MODEi. CODE, supra note 48, EC 2-26.
, .. Brickman, supra note 59, at 70-74.
110
Id. at 54 nn.93 & 94, 74 n.171.
111
See infra notes 114-15, 1 I 8.
10

•
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sessment, contrary to his initial assessment, is that the claim is unlikely to
prevail or its value is considerably less, he can elect to seek immediate
compensation. Indeed, if the case "turns sour" either because his initial
assessment is wrong or because it is belied by information elicited during
the course of discovery (but not to the point where the claim is frivolous or
totally without merit) or because the amount of time he would have to
devote appears significantly greater, thereby reducing his projected hourly
rate of return, he may be motivated to be relieved of his obligation to
pursue the claim. By being uncommunicative or otherwise obviously disinterested in pursuing the claim, he can induce the client to discharge him,
thereby entitling him to the more preferable quantum meruit. 112 Allowing
the attorney to elect quantum meruit without regard to the outcome of the
underlying action is, therefore, the antithesis of the fiduciary policy that is
the foundation of Martin v. Camp.

E.

Relevant Factors in Determining Fees

The essence of the contingent fee agreement is that the attorney's fee
will be determined solely by the result achieved in the case. Accordingly, it
makes little sense to depart from this essential feature of the contingent fee
agreement absent overriding policy considerations. The relevant policy
considerations in the context of client discharge, 113 however, support adherence to the general rule requiring that all fees growing out of contingent fee retainer agreements be determined subsequent to the outcome of
the litigation.
Although the Martin court failed to state what criteria should be used
to establish the reasonable fee due the attorney, in cases where the attorney has elected a contingent percentage, most courts routinely state that
the results obtained are important, if not essential, in determining the outgoing attorney's recovery. 114 Moreover, it is not until the conclusion of the
111
One court engaged in a discussion about attorney recovery following discharge and maintained that if recovery were not limited to the contract price, then the rule would encourage attorneys
" to induce clients to lose confidence in them in cases where the reasonable value of their services has
exceeded the original fee and thereby , upon being discharged, reap a greater benefit than that for
which they had bargained." Chambliss, Bahner & Crawford v. Luther, 531 S.W .2d 108, 113 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1975). For a discussion of what constitutes "cause" for discharge , see infra notes 11-9-37 and
accompanying text.
111
See generally section III of this Article.
11
• See, e.g., Shattuck v. Pennsylvania R. Co. , 48 F.2d 346 (W.D .N.Y. 1931); Cordes v. Purcell,
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case that "all of the factors properly determining compensation, especially
the size of the recovery, have been ascertained." 1111
Awaiting the outcome of the litigation before a fee can be determined
comports with the relevant factors listed in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility for determining fees. 116 While guidelines are not
given as to how the factors should be balanced, relevant factors include
whether the fee is fixed or contingent, the amount involved, and the results obtained.117 In the case of a contingency fee contract, the latter two
elements cannot be ascertained until the underlying litigation is complete.
Failure to account for the outcome of the litigation is likely to result in
consequences perverse to the client discharge rule.118 It opens up the posFritz & lngrao, 453 N .Y.S .2d 237 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Williams v. Hertz Corp., 427 N .Y.S.2d
825 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980), ajfd, 452 N.E.2d 1265 (N.Y. 1983); In rt Shaad, 399 N .Y.S.2d 822
(N .Y. App. Div. 1977); Reubenbaum v. B. & H . Express, 174 N .Y.S.2d 287 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958).
Although a quantum meruit recovery is no longer an action on the contract, a court can still regard
the initial terms of that agreement in determining fees . Set, e.g., Salem Realty Co. v. Matera, 410
N.E.2d 716 , 719 (Mass. Ct. App. 1980), ajfd, 426 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1981).
111
Rtubenbaum, 174 N .Y.S.2d at 290 (despite its acknowledgment the court pronounced that
compensation could be fixed immediately upon discharge) .
11
• The following factors are listed in DR 2-106(B) as relevant factors in determining the reasonableness of fees:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particula r employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MODEL CODE, supra note 48, DR 2-106(8). The guidelines set forth in DR 2-106 attempt to protect
the public from exorbitant fees as well as give lawyers parameters in charging for legal services.
ROBERT H. ARONSON, ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS: REGULATION & REVIEW 23 (Federal Judicial Center 1980); Fox & Assocs. Co., L .P .A. v. Purdon , 541 N .E.2d 448, 450 (Ohio 1989).
Like the Model Code, Model Rule 1.5 necessitates that the attorney's fee must be reasonable. The
comments to this Model Rule highlight that a factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the fee includes whether the relationship between the attorney and client is a continuing one.
MoDEI. RULES, supra note 48, Rule 1.5. Set also Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products, 373 So. 2d 102,
116 (La. 1978) (" permitting a lawyer to reap .. . the contracted-for [contingency] fee . . . violates the
strictures of DR 2-106").
117
MODEL CODE , supra note 48, DR 2-106(5)(4), (8).
111
This was exemplified in O ' Brien v. Mulcahy, 244 N.Y .S. 701 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1930). The
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sibility that the attorney might be unjustly enriched if the fee received at
discharge turns out to be disproportionately large relative to the recovery.
The resultant penalty is abhorrent to the client discharge rule.
V.

THE ELUSIVENESS OF CAUSE

The Martin v. Camp paradigm is that a client may discharge his attorney without penalty even "without cause." Throughout this Article, it has
been assumed that the attorney retained on a contingent fee basis has been
discharged "without cause." If the discharge were for "cause," then the
rule's application would be obviated since the attorney would then not be
entitled to a fee or to a retaining lien .119
What constitutes "cause," however, in the context of client discharge is
an elusive concept. While some courts have blithely assumed that the issue
is easily resolvable by ukase,uo other courts acknowledge that the client
discharged attorney, presumably believing the case was worth less than at the outset, had his fee fixed
immediately upon discharge. This fixed fee of SSOO turned out to be much less than the $3,750 fee
(25% contin~ent fee) he would have received had he not been discharged. The court finding the fee
unreasonable and inadequate in light of the outcome remanded the case for a rehearing on the issue of
fees. 244 N.Y.S. at 702. Implicitly at least, the court recognized that it is inane to set fees without
regard to the outcome of the case. Although the courts have discretionary power to intervene in attorney-client fee arrangements and thus can monitor them to preclude such results as in O'Brien , in an
era of overcrowded dockets this surely is not an efficient use of judicial resources. See also Shattuck v.
Pennsylvania R. Co. , 48 F .2d 346 (W.D.N .Y. 1931).
111
See Teichner v. W & J Holsteins, Inc., 478 N .E.2d 177 (N.Y. 1985); In re Weitling, 194
N.E. 401 (N.Y. 1935); Marschke v. Cross, 440 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Williams v.
Hertz Corp., 427 N.Y.S.2d 825 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); see also MACKINNON, supra note 60, at 7780; Nancy L. Sindell, Note, Toward a Uniform System of Attorney Fee Forfeiture, 9 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1859 (1988).
11
• For instance, in Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman , 741 S.W .2d 233 (Ark. 1987), while
the reviewing court agreed with the trial court that the client "did not have just cause to discharge his
attorney ," it willingly stated that there were no specific findings of fact and neither were any requested. Id . at 238. One New York court, affirming the lower court's finding that the discharge was
without cause, insisted as a matter of faith that the the lower court " must have, at least by implication, first determined that [the discharged attorney] was not discharged for cause or misconduct." Kyle
v. Kyle, 463 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). See also Rosen v. Rosen, 468 N.Y.S.2d 723
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (assuming that the attorney's withdrawal was for "just cause" though not
bothering to indicate what that cause was). This typical mode (or failure) of analysis does nothing to
get one farther towards what constitutes "cause" for discharge. One commentator saw the element of
"cause" as a factor courts would be able to use to protect the professional relationship of attorney and
client. William F. Hoefs, Note, Attorney Client - Damages - Breach of Contingent Fee Contract,
1960 Wis. L. REV. 156, 159. However, he opined that " the use of this tool [would] be limited to cases
involving professional incompetence or bad faith." Id .
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has been furnished with no reliable test of whether he has legal cause for
terminating the retainer agreement. 121 Though it is sometimes clear at the
extremes whether the discharge is with or without cause, 122 there is a
large intermediate area in which lawyers are probably discharged for
valid reasons which do not rise to the level of legal cause. 123 Thus, even
when a court has concluded that an attorney has been discharged "without cause," the conclusion that the client had no reasonable cause for discharging the attorney does not readily follow. In Smith v. Westside
Transit Lines, Inc., 124 the discharged attorney had been employed under
a contingent fee contract and the substituted attorney obtained a settlement. The court maintained that although the client in a certain sense had
good cause - at least in everyday vernacular - for discharging the attorney, the client was still liable to him in quantum meruit, thereby negating
that good cause rises to the level of legal cause. The court went on to say:
The relation between attorney and client is a close personal relationship which is far more complex than simply whether the attorney is
performing his professional responsibilities and obligations in the
proper manner ... . The client is frequently impatient with the progress and anxious about the outcome of the case ... . The personalities of the attorney and client, especially as they are revealed to each
other, frequently play a much greater part in the relationship be111
See Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P .2d 9, 13 (Calif. 1972) (citing 1 WJTKIN, CALIFORNIA PRoCF:DURE 113-14 (2d ed. 1970)).
111
E.g., Brill v. Friends World College, 520 N .Y.S .2d 160 (N .Y. App. Div. 1987) (It is clear
when the attorney was discharged from the case for conduct violating Disciplinary Rule 5- 101 (B) that
it was for cause.); In rt Zlobec, 519 N .Y.S.2d 745 (N .Y. App. Div. 1987) (attorney who improperly
obtained the consent of the Executrix to represent her and her estate was discharged for cause) . But
see Teichner v. W & J Holsteins, Inc., 478 N .E .2d 177 (N.Y. 1985) (a hearing is required to determine whether allegations of personal misconduct and extortionate conduct constitute cause); Burns
Jackson Miller Summit & Jacoby v. Rice (In rt Peerless Sales Corp.), 480 N .Y.S.2d 508 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1984) (an attorney who accomplished that which he was hired to do was not discharged for
cause); Covington v. Rhodes, 247 S.E.2d 305 (N .C . Ct. App. 1978) (discharge was without cause even
though attorney lost papers and missed meetings).
111
This problem -was spelled out explicitly by one court which stated, " From the record herein,
it cannot be said that defendant discharged plaintiff for cause . · . . . However . . . . [u ]nder the
circumstances, it cannot be said he was removed without cause either." Hausen v. Davis, 448
N.Y .S.2d 87, 90 (N .Y. Civ. Ct. 1981). In Hausen, the attorney had prepared a summons and complaint almost a year and a half following the attorney's employment by the client. At that time , the
attorney was unable to serve the papers because he was unable to locate the owner of the offending
vehicle. Thus, while the attorney did not engage in misconduct, he did not effectively pursue his
client's claim. 448 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
,.. 313 So. 2d 371 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
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tween the parties than the professional activities of the attorney in
the handling of the case. m
This forthright acknowledgment of the role of interpersonal relations in
the lawyer-client relationship is indicative of why trust and confidence underpin the client discharge rule. For effective representation, the client
must fully confide in his attorney and rely on his professional skills; their
relationship, therefore, becomes threateningly attenuated as the client loses
confidence or trust in the attorney and the client becomes increasingly inhibited in the sharing of confidences. 126 Justifiable client discontent with
lawyers has been well documented by many commentators. One has discussed at length that while the legal profession assumes that the attorneyclient relationship is based upon trust, 127 many attorneys and clients mistrust one another. 126 Another commentator has also maintained that there
are significant reasons to question the attorney's ability to identify the cli,.. Id. at 376.
• See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
127
See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Contrary to such traditional suppositions, many
12

revisionist commentators question the essential premise of the attorney-client relationship in which
trust and loyalty are paramount and conflicts of interest virtually non-existent. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E .
ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE 111-12 (1974) ("[T)he inexorability of the
economic conflict of interest between lawyer and client in so many cases, raises a serious question
about the appropriateness of the traditional ideal that an ethical and competent lawyer can and will
make the client's interest his own."); Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and
Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1021 (1981) (arguing that there is an intrinsic conflict in the attorneyclient relationship since the attorney grows rich at the client's woes); Judith L . Maute, Allocation of
Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1049, 1058-59 (1984) (arguing that the "paternalistic lawyer subverts client autonomy , imposes her
own moral values and pursues standardized, imputed ends that are unresponsive to the client's actual
needs") ; Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Clitnt Relationship: The Argument
for Autonomy, 65 N .C. L. REV. 315 (1987).
,.. Burt, supra note 127, at 1019-26. Although attorneys can mistrust their clients, client mistrust is more problematic since the lawyer is generally the dominant party in the relationship and
because clients are dependent upon their attorneys. Burt argues that the legal profession's denial of
the mistrust harms the ability of the two to work together effectively. Others have also argued that the
attorney-client relationship is viewed by the profession as unilateral with the attorney as the dominant
actor providing the professional services which he deems appropriate. Eric H. Steele & Raymond T.
Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regulation , I 976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 917 , 950.
Similarly, Rosenthal maintains that the traditional paternalistic model of the attorney-client relationship discourages client involvement. Rosenthal found that clients who actively participated in their
cases and were more demanding of their lawyers received better services than did passive clients whom
lawyers do not feel as accountable towards. ROSENTHAL, supra note 127, at 61. See also Roger W .
Andersen, Informed Decisionmaking in an Office Practice, 28 B.C . L. REV. 225 (1987) (when clients
are fully informed they can make intelligent decisions).
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ent's concerns accurately. 129 Others have reported that clients generally do
not feel at ease with their lawyers' attitudes towards them. 130 These arguments are further augmented by a survey in which 44.1 percent indicated
that lawyers are not very good at keeping clients informed; 131 sixty-two
percent believed that lawyers charge more for their services than they are
actually worth; and 38.6 percent felt that lawyers are not prompt 132 about
getting things accomplished. 133 Thus, although there is ample documentation to support the proposition that clients discharge attorneys for valid
reasons, courts generally refuse to recognize that these reasons rise to the
level of legal cause.
Moreover, it is difficult for the client to establish that he had legally
sufficient cause for discharge because of problems of proof. To the extent
that the reasons are the failure of the attorney to keep the client informed
or to respond to inquiries, it is highly unlikely that a sufficient paper trail
exists to support the client's claim. 13' Clients are typically unprepared to
deal with their lawyers in an adversarial posture and, therefore, do not
, .. Strauss, supra note 127, at 328-31. Other commentators studying attorney-client interactions
have found that "condemnation of other lawyers occurs frequently [during attorney-client discourses]
and tends t~ promote client cynicism. As a result, clients might increasingly perceive legal professionals as insufficiently self-disciplined or as excessively self-interested, or simply as insensitive and unethical." Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the
Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663, 1682 (1989). This observation could lead clients to lose
confidence in their own attorneys prompting their discharge. It is unlikely, however, that these client
perceptions and responses would constitute legal cause for discharge.
uo Steck & Nimmer, supra note 128, at 951, 957; su also Lisa G . Lerman, Lying to Clients,
138 U. PA. L. REV . 659, 663 (1990) (arguing that attorneys deceive their clients more than the ethics
code or bar acknowledges).
111
" A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information." MODEL RULES, supra note 48, Ruic 1.4.
111
However, the Model Rules state that "(a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client." MODEL RULES, supra note 48, Rule 1.3.
m Curran & Spalding, The Legal Nuds of the Public, A Preliminary Report (1974). Su also
Steele & Nimmer, supra note 128, at 975. In that survey it was estimated that approximately 16% of
people who used lawyers had problems with them. The major complaints were that the lawyers 1)
failed to effectively communicate, 2) did not work promptly, and 3) did not work hard. Although such
factors are non-quantifiable, they undoubtedly contribute to the attenuation of confidence that a client
reposes in his attorney. Yet, it seems unlikely that a court would conclude that these factors constitute
legal cause. Failure to return phone calls is another factor that would lead to client discontent yet
would not likely constitute legal cause.
u, Lerman, supra note 130, at 664 (arguing that a consequence of the private nature of attorney-client communications is that lawyers' conduct with clients receives less scrutiny than their conduct before a public tribunal) .

1992]

SETTING THE FEE

397

keep detailed records of their attempts to communicate with, and the responses from, their attorneys.
Finally, despite suggestions otherwise, 1811 there is no evidence that clients discharge lawyers for frivolous reasons. 186 In fact, the very act of the
client discharging his attorney belies the notion that it is for frivolous reasons since the client must take on the additional task of fin'ding another
attorney ai:id the attendant risk he will be liable for additional fees. 187
Relying on "without cause" as a policy basis for penalizing the client's
act of discharge is without justification.
VI.

LEGISLATIVE POLICY SUPPORTS MARTIN V. CAMP

Several legislatures have enacted attorney lien statutes reflecting policies
contrary to those of the courts misapplying Martin v. Camp. While the
statutes do not deal directly with client discharge, they do illustrate the
importance of focusing on the underlying recovery. Thus, the Illinois Attorney's Lien Act 138 provides that an attorney shall have a charging lien
on the effectuation of the judgment. 189 If the attorney perfects a lien without the client recovering on the underlying claim, the attorney receives
136

See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
Id. Although courts rejecting the quantum meruit rule and other judges dissenting from the
application of the rule maintain that use of the client discharge rule results in the wholesale discharge
of attorneys and thus a reluctance on their part to enter into contingency fee contracts, there is no
support for these claims. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
137
See Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 111 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960). The Gair
court held that:
[t]he duty and function of the Appellate Divisions to keep the house of the law in order
does not hinge upon whether clients, worn down by injuries, delay, financial need and
counsel holding the purse strings of settlement, knowing little about law or lawyers, have
had the stamina to resist in court by hiring other lawyers to be paid out of the other half of
the recovery for defending against the first lawyer.
11
• ILL REV. STAT. ch. 13, para. 14 (1909). The Illinois statute states in relevant part:
Attorney at law shall have a lien upon all claims, demands and causes of action . .. which
may be placed in their hands by their clients for suit or collection, or upon which suit or
action has been instituted, for the amount of any fee which may have been agreed upon by
and between such attorneys and their clients ... and such lien shall attach to any verdict,
judgment or decree entered and to any money or property which may be recovered ....
••• Id. A charging lien gives the attorney the right to have the proceeds of the client's claim
applied to the payment of his fees in connection with that claim, thereby protecting the attorney's
right to compensation. People v. Keeffe, 405 N.E.2d 1012 (N .Y. 1980); In re Estate of Gutchess, 456
N.Y.S.2d 249 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
138
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nothing as "the failure of [the attorney's) client to receive any proceeds
from the prior judgment mearit the lien was incapable of attaching to
anything. " 140
Similarly, Minnesota's lien law 141 provides for an attorney to obtain a
charging lien upon a judgment; the theory behind permitting the lien is
that "a successful party should not be permitted the fruits of the judgment
secured by the attorney's services without paying for those services." 142
This theory reflects a policy underlying charging liens of both avoiding
unjust enrichment to the client and not allowing the attorney recovery
when the client has not benefited from the attorney's services.
Instructively, New York's charging lien law, 143 which predates Martin
v. Camp, sets forth a legislative policy which conflicts with the judicial
decisions entitling an attorney to quantum meruit even if the underlying
action fails. This legislative policy is consonant with the rationale in Martin v. Camp that a client not be penalized for discharging his attorney.
However, it is inconsistent with those cases allowing for the possibility of
enriching the contingent fee attorney at the client's expense.
Section 4 7 5 confers upon an attorney the right to a charging lien on his
client's cause of action and hence any proceeds which ensue therefrom. 144
Essentially, this allows the discharged attorney to retain a type of security
interest when turning over the client's files to his replacement, thereby
substituting a charging lien for his relinquished retaining lien.m To en0
"
Marcus v./Wilson , 306 N.E.2d 554, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). See also Anastos v. O'Brien,
279' N .E.2d 759, 764 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) .(attorncy's lien docs not give a lawyer "any interest in a
litigation other than the proceeds"). Other cases giving an attorney with a charging lien an interest
only in the proceeds of the claim include: Upgrade Corp. v. Michigan Carton Co., 410 N .E.2d 159,
161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Jovan v. Starr, 231 N.E.2d 637 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967); Clarke v. Ireland, 106
N.E.2d 818 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952) .
... MINN. STAT. § 481.13 (1986).
141
Boline v. Doty, 345 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Schroeder v. Modern
Electronic Prod., Inc., 295 N.W.2d 514 (Minn. 1980)).
10
N .Y. Juo. LAW § 475 (McKinney 1938).
"' Kaplan v. Port Taxi , Inc., 452 N .Y.S.2d 437, 438 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) ("the sina [sic] qua
non for asserting a nonpossessory charging lien is existence of proceeds created by the attorney's
efforts").
"" For an analysis of attorneys' liens in New York, see I WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK REAi.
PROPERTY, ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 6, at 84 (Pocket Part May 1991). A retaining lien compels payment because the attorney can withhold documents that the client may need to continue the action ,
forcing the client to pay charges justly due. Tri-Ex Enters, Inc. v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 583
F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The attorney may withhold the property until the lien is satisfied or
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force the charging lien, either the client or the attorney must first petition
the court which will then determine its amount. 148 In its enforcement order, the court may "direct that the lien be satisfied out of money or property to which the lien attaches even though it is not in the possession or
control of the attorney." 147 Furthermore, "if an attorney is discharged
without cause he will be allowed [his] charging lien upon the proceeds of
the lawsuit, the amount to be determined on a quantum meruit basis at
the conclusion of the case, and his fees will be made a charge included
within the fees to which the incoming attorney will be entitled." 148
Significantly, under these lien laws, the fixing of the quantum meruit
amount in the case of the discharged attorney is not done until there is a
final outcome in the underlying action.148 Hence, the right of an attorney
to recover his charging lien depends on the success or failure of the client
in the underlying action. "When the cause of action does not eventuate in
a recovery for the client, the lien has nothing to fasten to. Hence, when
the cause of action is dismissed the lien fails. " 1110
These lien laws, as interpreted and administered by the courts, embody
the most equitable and sound application of the quantum meruit rule.
Essentially, the statutes' intent 1111 is to uphold the policy rationale which
the Martin v. Camp court espoused while eliminating the potential danadequately secured; the lie~ is extinguished when possession ends. Manfred & Sons, Inc. v. Mortil•
laro, 416 N .Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Eiduson Fuel & Hardware Co. v. Drew, 399
N .Y.S.2d 764 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). The common-law retaining lien extends to "any of the client's
books, papers, money and securities which arc in the attorney's possession." Steves v. Serlin, 509
N .Y.S.2d 666, 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). However, where the common-law retaining lien can con•
flict with the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship, courts have circumscribed their use.
Rosen v. Rosen , 468 N .Y.S.2d 723 (N .Y. App. Div. 1983) (indigent client's former counsel given
charging lien rather than retaining lien since the latter would render it impossible for her to continue
case).
"' People v. Keefe, 405 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 1980) (quoting Hovey v. Elliot, 23 N.E. 475
(N.Y. 1890)).
141
Id. at 1015 (citations omitted).
"" Id. (citations omitted).
'" Id . See also DcSalvatorc v. Lavigne, 533 N .Y.S.2d 41 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (the amount of
a charging lien should be determined subsequent to any recovery at trial or settlement in the underlying action); In re Shaad, 399 N .Y.S.2d 822, 823 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (the amount of the lien is
determined subsequent to any (ecovery because the amount of recovery is an element in determining a
reasonable fee) .
11
• Owen v. Forchelli, 249 N .Y.S.2d 913, 914 (N .Y. Civ. Ct. 1964).
••• Cf. Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 741 S.W .2d 233, 236 (Ark. 1987) (noting the
importance of the "intent" of a similar attorney's lien statute).
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ger of unjust enrichment, a danger which the courts' misapplications of

Martin v. Camp have created. Under these lien laws, in a contingent fee
action, the client is not obligated to pay a fee unless he succeeds in the
underlying action. Such a result preserves the incentive structure that is
the basis for the contingent fee agreement. It also preserves the feature of
the certainty of attorney recovery if the claim prevails. While there is a
risk of no recovery - indeed there has to be such a risk for the contingent
fee to be legally and ethically valid 1112 - and this risk is somewhat accentuated by the client discharge rule, the court will account for this risk in
fixing the quantum meruit award in light of the outcome of the underlying action. 1113 For those courts concerned about clients' ·abilities to secure
contingent fee representation, adoption of this policy would at least maintain attorneys' incentives for entering such agreements. Moreover, it appears that any such concerns for attorneys' incentives are misplaced; the
incentives present already appear far in excess of the requirements to secure access for impecunious clients to the legal claims process. 1114
CONCLUSION

Martin v. Camp established the rule that a client could discharge his
attorney without penalty even if without cause. The rule's rationale is
based upon the necessity of reposing trust and confidence in the attorney.
Once that trust and confidence dissipate, the basis for the relationship is
undermined and the client should have the right to terminate the relationship. The right to terminate would be evanescent if the client were then to
be liable for contract damages. Allowing the client to discharge his attorney without penalty deprives the attorney of the value of his expectancy
but allows him to recover in quantum meruit for his efforts prior to
discharge.
The use of overbroad language to resolve the subsidiary issues in Martin v. Camp involving the statute of limitations and maturity of the right
to seek a fee led several jurisdictions to conclude that a discharged attorney employed on a contingent fee basis could be entitled to a fee in excess
111

See Brickman, supra note 59, at 30-31.
u• So if the underlying action is very successful, the quantum meruit amount will yield a higher
amount. See supra notes 108, 112.
, .. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99; see also Walter Olson, Sue City, The Case Against
the Contingency Fee, Poucv REV. 46 (Winter 1991).
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of the contract price.
This Article has demonstrated that this application of Martin v. Camp
miscontrues its basic policy rationale and misapplies its central holding by
allowing the client to be penalized for exercising his discharge right.
By enacting charging lien laws, legislatures created a structure which
fully serves both client and contingent fee attorney in the event the client
dismisses the attorney. The results embody the policies underlying contingent fee agreements while avoiding unjustly enriching either party, because the amount of the attorney's compensation is not determined until
the client's recovery occurs. The language in those cases allowing for a
contrary outcome 1 H should be rejected. Policy arguments advanced by
courts in support of their anomalous application of Martin v. Camp have
been demonstrated to be unfounded, implausible, inconsistent with reality,
and adverse to other, equally important, policies. Actions by contingent fee
attorneys for quantum meruit ·in the event of client discharge should be
stayed until the outcome of the underlying action, and if the client fails to
recover then no fee should be recoverable by the discharged contingent fee .
attorney. If the client does recover, the recovery should be limited by the
contract percentage.

11
•

See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.

